Os corpos no cinema estão sob a ordem de um olhar soberano que nos diz para onde devemos olhar e como devemos fazer isso. É um olhar poderoso que tudo sabe e tudo pode. Um olhar que nos posiciona não como simples espectadores, mas como sujeitos. É a partir daí que buscamos compreender como se arquitetam o medo, ou seja, qual é a ordem do cinema de horror, tecido com a pena do medo? Nessa arquitetura, os corpos aparecem como (...) lugares para vigiar e punir em espaços utópicos e heterotópicos. Espaços de memórias. Espaços de poder vigiar e punir. Espaço onde se impõe uma posição de sujeito, um poder sobre o sujeito. Portanto, os corpos no cinema de horror são artefatos para uma arqueologia do medo, escrita pelo poder do horror sobre estes corpos. Daí nosso interesse por esses lugares. Para demonstrar essa arqueologia, utilizaremos dois filmes franceses, produzidos em 2007, Frontière(s) e À l’interieur como espaços de horror construídos para o medo pelas vias da utopia e heterotopias pensadas por Michel Foucault, filósofo do presente, do nosso presente para compreender como se arquitetam tal medo por meio de sua história arqueológica, prática de um espaço chamado Labedisco/UESB. (shrink)

Este texto construye una versión de la teoría de Hegel acerca de la sanción penal, principalmente a partir de su Fundamentos de la Filosofía del Derecho, como una teoría agnóstica da la pena. El texto demuestra como la contradicción interna presentada por Hegel en cuanto el filósofo intenta resolver los problemas acerca de la punición no son resueltas, pero, por el contrario, como esas contradicciones necesariamente se integran a todo posible concepto o imposición de la sanción criminal.

Editorial - Dossiê Espiritualidade e saúde - Horizonte, v. 19, n. 60, set./dez. 2021. “Acho que nunca passei um minuto do dia me perguntando por que eu realizei este trabalho, ou se valeu à pena. O chamado para proteger a vida – e não apenas a vida, mas a identidade de outra pessoa; talvez não seja demais dizer a alma de outra pessoa – era óbvio em sua sacralidade. Antes de operar o cérebro de um paciente, eu entendi que (...) eu primeiro preciso conhecer a sua mente: sua identidade, seus valores, o que faz a sua vida valer à pena, e que tipo de devastação é razoável para deixar aquela vida terminar”. KALANITHI, 2016, p. 97-98). (shrink)

JUIZ, FORMA E SUBJETIVIDADE: A IDEOLOGIA COMO IMPOSIÇÃO NA APLICAÇÃO DA PENA BASE.

Esta obra traz ao leitor ensaios publicados ao longo de algumas décadas, alinhados a tradição brasileira de 'pensamento social'. Entre os vários intelectuais e pensadores analisados por Castro Santos, a obra de Gilberto Freyre, um dos maiores nomes de nosso tempo, mereceu atenção especial. Além do escritor pernambucano, todos os demais autores tratados neste livro revelam uma preocupação com o Brasil, uma intenção de 'reinventar' um país, gerar uma nação, criar metáforas de transformação social, converter idiomas e, regionalismos a uma (...) 'língua geral' de brasilidade. Nomes ilustres e obras hoje clássicas na tradição do pensamento social no Brasil passam pelo crivo do autor, sociólogo pertencente a geração que se voltou para grandes temas e cenários, sempre a cautelosa distância da excessiva especialização profissional dos dias atuais. Apesar da diversidade de perspectivas ou pontos de vista, os autores discutidos neste livro estão sempre a 'conjugar o futuro': a exemplo dos positivistas progressistas, como Pereira Barreto, ou dos agitadores das reformas na educação e saúde, como Azevedo Sodré, Arthur Neiva e Belisário Pena - esses últimos, figuras de destaque da Primeira República; por outro lado, em que pese a diversidade ainda maior de ideais e projetos, em autores como Gilberto Freyre e Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, ou na contribuição destacada de Antonio Candido, há sempre a preocupação de reinventarmo-nos (como já se disse deles), em um sentido que se poderia chamar totalizador. Isto é, trata-se de entender o país, retratá-lo, discutir projetos e novos caminhos. Na agenda intelectual da atualidade, aquela intenção não deveria jamais ser perdida. Essa intenção em 'pensar o país' remete sempre as preocupações do autor, ao relançar, pela EdUERJ, o presente livro. (shrink)

In a pessimistic view, the world is a series of struggles and sufferings. The tribulations are inevitable to man’s life for he is in the world. Pandemic, poverty and corruption are the most prominent and prevailing faces of struggles in the world. It affects the individual’s lives deeply for it undercuts the experience of being alive and free. It weakens man’s appreciation of moments due to misery. The conflicts in the world holds man to appreciate moments for they are occupied (...) on their functionality. The world simply becomes a mechanical for the people lives like a machine where working is much important than reflecting. These problematic figures were paralleled to Gabriel Marcel’s concept of broken world. The paper tends to justify that the world is broken for the reason that first, its problems that could be seen in the contemporary world as pandemic, poverty and corruption. Second, man becomes alienated from himself for he ceases on living due to this problematic world. This paper also ventured to Gabriel Marcel’s concept of broken world which eventually paralleled to the mainstream problems in contemporary world. The author intended to present a pessimistic view about the world which he claimed to be mad and broken. (shrink)

Quando se fala em património cultural, uma área que costuma ficar na penumbra é a dos arquivos históricos. De entre estes, um dos conjuntos mais vulneráveis é o dos arquivos de editoras e outros agentes da edição. Este artigo propõe uma reflexão em torno do património arquivístico em geral e dos arquivos das editoras em particular, a nível internacional. Tal digressão analítica e problematizante serve, em boa medida, para ajudar a repensar o caso português, cujos atrasos e impasses urge solucionar, (...) sob pena de se perderem irremediavelmente fontes preciosas para o conhecimento da nossa contemporaneidade. Em complemento, e a partir de um encontro específico organizado pelo autor, segue-se um conjunto de reflexões de distintos agentes do meio cultural, da autoria de José Pacheco Pereira, João Corregedor da Fonseca e José Antunes Ribeiro. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem como principal foco de análise o currículo oficial português relacionado com a componente de História, para o Ensino Básico, em particular as ausências que aí mais sobressaem. Estas podem relacionar-se com os conhecimentos substantivos que se apartam da abordagem preconizada por variadas razões (passados incómodos? temas difíceis? grupos não poderosos? …) ou com as competências de pensamento histórico (multiperspetiva, significância, causalidade, empatia, …) que parecem ter sido esquecidas quando se estruturou certo percurso de aprendizagem para estudantes com (...) idades entre os 6 e os 15 anos. Como considerações maiores, constata-se, naqueles textos curriculares (denominado Aprendizagens Essenciais), uma aparente simplificação genérica da narrativa histórica que se conta aos mais jovens cidadãos do mundo atual. A inevitável seleção de determinados saberes em detrimento de outros, na verdade, contribui, acima de tudo, para o escamotear de uma literacia histórica que podia, e devia, alcançar outros níveis. O processo de ensino (e de aprendizagem) da História, desde o começo da escolaridade obrigatória, tem de orientar-se no sentido de uma formação cidadã, esclarecida, democrática, intertemporal. As inexistências no que concerne aos conteúdos considerados ou ao raciocínio potenciado, por sua vez, somente comprometem aquele desígnio. (shrink)

Bowman-Smart et al. (2023) suggest that the current ethical frameworks used to evaluate the use of noninvasive prenatal technologies (e.g., NIPT) are inconsistent when used to analyze the ethics of...

Las normas internacionales, como la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad, suponen un avance hacia la equidad. Asimismo, im­plican tanto un incremento de la legislación nacional y autonómica, como una mayor complejidad institucional, para hacer efectivos estos derechos. Por ello, queremos conocer cómo se ha implementado el derecho a la accesibilidad univer­sal en la legislación. Se realizó un análisis de contenido de 36 normas relaciona­das con la discapacidad y la dependencia en Aragón. Finalmente, se detectó que, a (...) pesar de ciertos avances, la adaptación de la normativa no se ha consolidado, afectando al reconocimiento de derechos de las personas con discapacidad, espe­cialmente de las más jóvenes y aquellas con grandes necesidades de apoyo. (shrink)

Tyler Burge (2010) provided a scathing critique of all programs for naturalizing concepts of representation, especially teleological naturalizing programs. He tended to demonstrate that “representational content” is a concept that cannot be reduced to more fundamental biological or physical ideas. According to him, since the 1970s, the concept of representational content has been firmly established in cognitive psychology as a mature science and utilized inadequate explanations. Since Dretske’s program is Burge’s primary objective, this paper concentrates on Dretske’s perspective. Following Burge’s (...) criticisms, I concur that Dretske’s naturalizing program trivializes the complex concept of representational content in cognitive science by applying it to bacteria, protozoa, etc. There is a superior explanation, namely Burge’s alternative idea of “registering information.” I do not believe, however, that this spells the end of naturalization programs. There is no reason to deny that at least some biological functions entail representational capacities with perceptual constancy, if not all. Cases of genuine perception, representing the accurate distal causes of proximal stimuli under various conditions, contribute to fitness. It is not by accident that representational content plays a role in cases of genuine perception. Consequently, I will argue that accuracy and biological fitness cannot be separated. (shrink)

Este artigo, um recorte de pesquisa de Doutorado, objetiva desvelar as percepções de 208 professores de filosofia do Paraná no sentido de buscar evidenciar quais seriam as especificidades da disciplina de filosofia em relação a outras disciplinas do currículo. Inicialmente, disserta-se sobre a intermitência da disciplina de Filosofia no currículo da Educação Básica, com base em Deleuze e Guattari (2010), os quais demarcam o entendimento da filosofia como criação de conceitos. Em seguida, fundamentado em Rodrigues e Gelamo (2019), entre outros (...) autores, reflete-se sobre o modo de compreender a filosofia, que pode oscilar entre uma compreensão enciclopédica com base na memorização dos sistemas filosóficos e experiência filosófica. Por fim, por meio da análise de conteúdo de Bardin (2016), a seguinte questão de um questionário que envolvia outras dez foi analisada: “Você acredita que a filosofia proporciona espaços ou momentos diferenciados em relação aos das outras disciplinas? Se sim, no que ela se diferencia?”. Das respostas dos 208 docentes, emergiram as seguintes categorias: criar conceitos, espaço para o debate/reflexão de ideias, possibilidade da experiência filosófica e superar o senso comum. Os resultados apontam, assim, em um sentido de que a disciplina de filosofia não deve limitar-se a um conhecimento enciclopédico, mas, sim, trata-se de um conhecimento que se relaciona com o cotidiano de seus interlocutores. Faz-se necessário, porém, um saber valorizar adequadamente a história da filosofia, pois, ao valorizar demais a história da filosofia, pode-se incorrer a um ensino meramente descritivista; contudo, ao não valorizar a história da filosofia, pode-se debruçar em discussões sem conteúdo filosófico. (shrink)

parte 1. As ideologias no século XXI -- parte 2. Ideologias, ambiente(s), identidade(s).

This paper addresses Fichte’s puzzle of self-consciousness. I propose a new reading of “Fichte’s original insight,” inspired by Pareyson’s general reading, which I call here the “Fichtean metaphysical turn in transcendental philosophy.” Against the mainstream view in Fichte’s scholarship, I argue that Fichte’s and Kant’s views do not concur regard- ing the primary reference of the “I”, namely spontaneous agency in thinking, which Fichte calls “Tathandlung”. Yet, their views do, in fact, concur when Fichte claims that this spontaneous agency in (...) thinking is the “essence” or the underlying nature of the self, which Kant denies. Regarding this, I take the side of Fichte. But how is Fichte’s original insight supposed to solve the puzzle of self-consciousness? At that transcendental level, the puzzle does not arise because there is no need for self-identification in the first place. Transcendental self-knowledge results from the sui generis intellectual Selbstanschauung that everyone has of oneself as sheer spontaneous agency in thinking. But at the empirical level, the puzzle does not arise either and for the same reason. Reference to the embodied self dispenses with any self-identification because it is based on the fundamental metaphysical relation everybody has to their own body, namely identity. (shrink)

How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model. The guiding line is the key Wittgensteinian insight of his Private Language Argument, namely the claim that no inner perception of qualia can justify our corresponding qualia-beliefs. My reworking of the original model starts with the rejection of Dretske’s representationalism, as (...) well as any other metaphysical views about the ultimate nature of qualia. The reworking of the displaced perception model I am proposing is supposed to be compatible with any available meta- physical view on qualia. The second step consists of rejecting the epistemological misgivings of the original model, namely the view that knowing qualia requires “connecting beliefs” along with “meta-representations.” Yet, Dretske’s crucial mistake has been to force knowledge of qualia into the “belief-box.” As a matter of fact, there is only one belief involved in intro- specting qualia, namely the qualia-belief itself. The third final step is this. Assuming the key Wittgensteinian insight, I argue that introspection of qualia is a process that is both epis- temically reliable and automatic. It is reliable because it dispenses with justification of any beliefs whatsoever. Moreover, it is automatic because it also dispenses with reflexive con- necting beliefs. For example, it takes nonconceptual awareness of the color blue as an input and automatically yields the belief that phenomenal blue is the conscious character of my experience of the sky as an output just by employing the concept BLUE. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a critical review of the recent nonconceptualist reading of the Kantian notion of sensible intuition. I raise two main objections. First, nonconceptualist readers fail to distinguish connected but different anti-intellectualist claims in the contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Second, I will argue that nonconceptual readings fail because Kan- tian intuitions do not possess a representational content of their own that can be veridical or falsidical in a similar way to how the content of propositional (...) attitudes is true or false. In this paper, I will support my own reading that sensible intuition is better seen as what Evans and McDowell have called a de re sense, whose main characteristic is object dependence. In this sense, Kantian sensible intuitions can be seen as a sensible mode of donation of objects. In my reading, the Kantian opposition between intuitions and concepts is best seen as the opposition between the objectual de re perception of something and the propositional de dicto apperception that something is the case rather than the opposition between nonconceptual and conceptual contents. However, if Kantian sensible intuition is not a mental state with nonconceptual content, it is certainly in the general anti-intellectualist neighborhood. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can (...) only reveal the relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations, but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations”. The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations”. In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self- concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint (2007), that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans (1982), which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I want to (...) support in this paper is the follow- ing: Since whether and to what extent we can attribute to non-linguistic creatures and prelinguistic infants genuine knowing self-reference or de se contents is an open empirical question, the proponents of the nonconceptual self-consciousness face a dilemma. If we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is overwhelming, I argue based on Evans’s Generality Constrain—that these self-representations are nothing but primitive prelinguis- tic self-concepts. However, if we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is not persuasive, I mainin—relying on Bermudez’s Conraint—that we do better by assuming that the subject is not self-represented. The content of her experiences and thoughts are best modeled as simple selfless propositional functions that are true or false relative to the subject of these experiences and thoughts. I refer to this as self-concernment without self- reference. Thus, against the recent ingenious work of Peacocke (2014), I claim that there is no compelling reason for postulating nonconceptual middle level self-representation, be- tween self-concernment and conceptual self-reference. However, as I hope to make clear, my claim is quite different from those of other recent oppositions to the idea of noncon- ceptual self-consciousness. According to the thesis of self-concernment without self-reference, the contents of experiences and thoughts are selfless propositional functions, true or false relative to the bearer of the respective mental states. (shrink)

This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higher-order cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view.” In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis) with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do represent (...) objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject. (shrink)

Sambin [6] proved the normalization theorem for GL, the modal logic of provability, in a sequent calculus version called by him GLS. His proof does not take into account the concept of reduction, commonly used in normalization proofs. Bellini [1], on the other hand, gave a normalization proof for GL using reductions. Indeed, Sambin's proof is a decision procedure which builds cut-free proofs. In this work we formalize this procedure as a recursive function and prove its recursiveness in an arithmetically (...) formalizable way, concluding that the normalization of GL can be formalized in PA. MSC: 03F05, 03B35, 03B45. (shrink)

This paper is a new non-descriptivist defense of nonconceptualism based on a new interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics of concepts. We advance the following claim: What distinguishes non-conceptual from conceptual singular representations is the way partial representations of the object’s features are integrated into the whole representation of the object, while at the non-conceptual level, this integration takes the form of images of the object’s features that are stored and projected, at the conceptual level this integration takes the form of the (...) recognition that those features are properties of a same object, what Kant calls “synthetic unity of Aperception”. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself (content-representationalism), but rather the vehicle of content (vehicle-representationalism), that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the relational properties (...) of experience (or of the brain) of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations. (shrink)

Se realizó una investigación cualitativa para comprobar la utilidad del cine como apoyo a la docencia en la asignatura de Psiquiatría del quinto año de la carrera de Medicina en tres subgrupos de estudiantes de la Universidad de Ciencias Médicas "Carlos J. Finlay" de Camagüey. La muestra ascendió a 43 estudiantes de ambos sexos y diferentes nacionalidades, a quienes se les realizaron entrevistas individuales grabadas en audio, explorando criterios personales tras haber presenciado un grupo de películas previamente escogidas por abordar (...) el tema del trastorno mental con profundidad. Las mismas se exhibieron una vez por semana, coincidiendo su tema con los objetivos propuestos según los contenidos, siempre después de la conferencia introductoria y clase taller, y antes del seminario correspondiente. Entre los resultados obtenidos se destaca que la totalidad expresó opiniones positivas respecto a la actividad, y propuso se mantuviera en el resto de las rotaciones de Psiquiatría. La totalidad consideró que la misma representó un enriquecimiento de su cultura general. La mayoría expresó que les fue fácil la identificación de síntomas, síndromes y situaciones causales en las películas utilizadas, y manifestó que existe una estrecha relación entre los contenidos semanales y las películas elegidas. Se recogieron además algunas sugerencias respecto a la actividad. Teniendo en cuenta los resultados obtenidos, se puede considerar como muy positiva la utilización del cine como apoyo a la actividad docente en Psiquiatría en el grupo estudiado. A qualitative research was carried out in three sub-groups of medical students at Carlos J. Finlay University in order to test the usefulness of films as a teaching aid for the 5th year subject of Psychiatry. The sample was composed of 43 students, both male and female, from different nationalities whose individual interviews were recorded in order to analyze personal criteria after watching a series of movies previously chosen since the plot deals with serious mental disorders. These were screened once a week. Their subject matter coincided with the objectives set according to the class content, always after the introductory lecture and workshop class, and before the corresponding seminar. The most outstanding results show that all students expressed positive views with regard to the activity, and suggested to maintain this initiative in the rest of Psychiatry rotations. All of them considered that this activity allowed them to enrich their general culture. Most expressed that it was easy for them to identify symptoms, syndromes and causal situations used in films and that there is a close relationship between the weekly contents and selected films. In addition some suggestions regarding the activity were collected. Taking into account the obtained results, the use of cinema as a teaching aid in Psychiatry can be considered as very positive in the studied group. (shrink)

Este livro apresenta a antropofagia como uma noção teórico-experiencial, uma atitude do corpo que reabilita o sensível e desperta o mundo percebido. A argumentação ressalta a dimensão sensível do corpo e do conhecimento, considerando sua sensibilidade e motricidade, corpo que não se separa da natureza e da história, atuando no mundo como presença viva, originária, em movimento, supondo um sujeito que, ao mesmo tempo em que constrói seus próprios sentidos, é dependente da experiência do outro no mundo, criando e recriando (...) a cultura, ampliando o processo de conhecer, sentir, pensar, agir, ser, transformar-se. Essa atitude anuncia um conhecimento sensível e um corpo que é capaz de sensação, mas também de expressão, de comunicação, de criação, aspectos indispensáveis para se pensar a educação como um espaço sensível, de aprendizagem e ressignificação da cultura. (shrink)

Este artigo é sobre a folksonomia como uma ferramenta que contribui para as atividades colaborativas de grupos de usuários na rede social acadêmica Passei Direto, com o objetivo de analisar a folksonomia como ferramenta de apoio em grupos colaborativos nessa rede social, por meio de estudo de caso holístico e exploratório, sendo realizada observação direta intensiva. A justificativa baseou-se na necessidade de compreender a potencialidade das atividades cooperativas e a solução das necessidades informacionais. Concluiu-se que a folksonomia é uma ferramenta (...) de apoio em grupos colaborativos no Passei Direto, onde os usuários, no uso de tags em práticas de indexação, visam a enriquecer e ampliar as possibilidades de acesso às informações. No entanto, apesar de representar uma ferramenta de forte cunho colaborativo, a folksonomia também deixa lacunas no tocante à recuperação da informação, dada a falta de padronização e controle dessa ferramenta, embora essas características façam parte da sua essência. (shrink)

ABSTRACT One major problem in the process of knowledge assimilation is how to deal with inconsistency of new knowledge and the existing knowledge base. In this paper we present a formal, provably correct and yet computational methodology for assimilation of new knowledge into knowledge bases about actions and changes based on the slogan: what is believed is what is explained. Technically, we employ Gelfond and Lifschitz' action description language A to describe domains of actions. The knowledge bases on domains of (...) actions are defined and obtained by a new translation from domain descriptions in A into abductive normal logic programs, where a time dimension is incorporated. The knowledge bases are shown to be both sound and complete with respect to their domain descriptions. In particular, we propose a possible causes approach (PCA) to knowledge assimilation about evolving domains of actions, in contrast to Ginsberg's possible worlds approach (PWA) and Winslett's possible models approach (PMA). A possible cause of new knowledge consists of abduced occurrences of actions and value propositions about the initial state of the domain of actions, that would allow to derive the new knowledge. We show how to compute possible causes with abductive logic programming, and present some techniques to improve search efficiency. We use examples to compare our possible causes approach with syntax-based approaches, such as Ginsberg's possible worlds approach, and semantics-based approaches, such as Winslett's possible models approach, to belief revision/update. (shrink)

Proceedings of the Tenth Brazilian Conference on Mathematical Logic. Coleção CLE, volume 14, 1995. Centro De Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência, Unicamp, Campinas, SP, Brazil.

The concept of every real thing from all eternity contains the unavoidability of its existence before the divine decision. Thus every complete concept of a real thing contains the property of being such that the thing will exist if a created universe exists. Then a thing's existence cannot be external to its concept. There is bound to be more in the concept of something that exists than in that of "something" that does not-since existence is explained through the quidditative property (...) of being an essence that constitutes an integral part of the most perfect series of things. Such an essential, quidditative perfection explains the divine decision, and hence existence. Therefore, existence can be deduced from that essential perfection. The essence-as-such, the mere possible, contains something from which existence follows. What Leibniz never manages to explain is what distinguishes existence from the quidditative perfection it unavoidably stems from. (edited). (shrink)

L’œuvre d’Edgar Morin n’est pas exclusivement la démarche d’un chercheur isolé. Elle fut, pendant une vingtaine d’années, acte de transmission de connaissance et d’échange de points de vue au sein de ses séminaires. Ici, il s’agissait alors d’essayer de faire apparaître la dimension d’une épistémologie de la complexité. Quel fut, dans le contexte des « séminaires de Morin », le processus d’interaction, d’osmoses, l’intensité du dialogue entre le penseur et les personnes qui fréquentaient les différentes séances ainsi organisées ? Enfin, (...) nous verrons dans ce texte que « l’épistémologie de la complexité n’a pas pour mission de retrouver la certitude perdue et le principe Un de la vérité » .The work of Edgar Morin is not only the process of an isolated researcher. It was, for twenty years, act of transmitting knowledge and exchange views in his seminars. Here, it was then trying to show the size of an epistemology of complexity. What was in the context of "seminars Morin," the process of interaction, osmosis, the intensity of the dialogue between the thinker and the people who attended the various sessions and organized? Finally, we see in this text that "the epistemology of complexity is not a mission to find the lost certainty and the principle of a truth". (shrink)